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 Analysing governance categories used on project 
alliances in the construction industry 
Karen Manley, Le Chen, Joanne Lewis 
Abstract 
In Australia, collaborative contracts, and in particular, project alliances, have been increasingly used 
to govern infrastructure projects. These contracts use formal and informal governance mechanisms to 
manage the delivery of infrastructure projects. Formal mechanisms such as financial risk sharing are 
specified in the contract, while informal mechanisms such as integrated teams are not. Given that the 
literature contains a multiplicity of often untestable definitions, this paper reports on a review of the 
literature to operationalize the concepts of formal and informal governance. This work is the first 
phase of a study that will examine the optimal balance of formal and informal governance structures. 
Desk-top review of leading journals in the areas of construction management and business 
management, as well as recent government documents and industry guidelines, was undertaken to to 
conceptualise and operationalize formal and informal governance mechanisms. The study primarily 
draws on transaction-cost economics (e.g. Williamson 1979; Williamson 1991), relational contract 
theory (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000) and social psychology theory (e.g. Gulati 1995). Content 
analysis of the literature was undertaken to identify key governance mechanisms. Content analysis is 
a commonly used methodology in the social sciences area. It provides rich data through the 
systematic and objective review of literature (Krippendorff 2004). NVivo 9, a qualitative data 
analysis software package, was used to assist in this process. 
A previous study by the authors identified that formal governance mechanisms can be classified into 
seven measurable categories: (1) negotiated cost, (2) competitive cost, (3) commercial framework, (4) 
risk and reward sharing, (5) qualitative performance, (6) collaborative multi-party agreement, and (7) 
early contractor involvement. Similarly, informal governance mechanisms can be classified into four 
measureable categories: (1) leadership structure, (2) integrated team, (3) team workshops, and (4) 
joint management system.  
This paper explores and further defines the key operational characteristics of each mechanism 
category, highlighting its impact on value for money in alliance project delivery. The paper’s 
contribution is that it provides the basis for future research to compare the impact of a range of 
individual mechanisms within each category, as a means of improving the performance of 
construction projects.  
Keywords: collaborative contracts, formal governance mechanisms, informal governance 
mechanisms, value for money, infrastructure projects, project alliances 
 
1. Introduction 
Recently published research undertaken by the authors (Chen, Manley et al. 2012) into the 
governance of collaborative construction projects identified categories of formal and informal 
governance mechanisms that are important to VfM. These categories arose from content analysis of 
relevant articles appearing in top journals in the construction management and general management 
fields. The categories were refined through triangulation and represent clearly defined and mutually 
exclusive groupings. This process resulted in identification of the categories shown in Table 1.  
Table 1: Categories of formal and informal governance for collaborative contracts 
Formal Governance Categories Informal Categories 
1. Negotiated cost 1. Leadership structure 
2. Competitive cost 2. Integrated team 
3. Commercial framework 3. Team workshops 
4. Risk and reward sharing 4.   Joint management system 
5. Qualitative performance   
6. Collaborative multi-party agreement  
7. Early contractor involvement  
 
The categories shown in Table 1 facilitated the design of a rigorous questionnaire to uncover the 
optimal balance of such mechanisms in the Australian infrastructure context. Formal mechanisms are 
grouped according to seven categories, comprising negotiated cost, competitive cost, commercial 
framework, risk and reward sharing, qualitative performance, collaborative multi-party agreement 
and early contractor involvement (Australian Constructors Association 1999; Morwood, Scott et al. 
2008; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008; Ross 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Lahdenperä 2010; Love, 
Mistry et al. 2010; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Lahdenperä 2012). Informal 
mechanisms are grouped according to four categories: leadership structure, integrated team, team 
workshops and joint management system (Yeung, Chan et al. 2007; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
2008). The aim of the current paper is to describe the operation of each governance category and its 
potential impact on value-for-money from constrution projects. 
The previous study by the authors indentified the key governance mechanisms outlined above and 
described their operation on two primary infrastructure delivery systems – project alliances and Early 
Contractor Involvement Contracts (Chen, Manley et al. 2012). A limitation of that paper was that it 
did not describe each mechanism in detail. The current paper remedies that shortcoming.  
2. Research Methods 
The research question driving the current study was ‘How do the different governance mechanisms 
on project alliances contribute to performance outcomes?’ As background to an empirical study of 
this question, the results presented here are based on a literature review that was undertaken to 
achieve two primary objectives. The first objective was to identify the essential features of both 
formal and informal mechanisms which have been applied on project alliances. Special attention was 
paid to the mechanisms which are associated with industry practices in Australia. The second 
objective was to seek evidence for the mechanisms’ influence on VfM. The findings of the literature 
review will be used to operationally define the mechanisms, and to propose hypotheses for further 
deductive investigation in the second phase of this study.  
The approach used to review the literature was directed content analysis (Krippendorff 2004). This 
approach uses well established theories and findings of prior research to identify key concepts and 
variables as initial coding categories (Krippendorff 2004). Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis software, 
was used to support the systematic process of coding and identifying themes (Dyer and Singh 1998). 
The literature review involved three steps, as detailed below.  
The first step of the review drew on transaction-cost economics theory (Williamson 1979; 
Williamson 1991), relational contract theory (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000), social psychology 
theory (e.g. Gulati 1995) and strategic alliances literature (e.g. Gulati and Singh 1998; Krishnan and 
Martin 2006; Luo 2007; Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009) to provide an understanding of the nature and 
governance structures of collabrative contracts. These four areas were targeted because they emerged 
as the most promising given the topic. They were identified through a high-level content analysis 
sweep of a broad range of likely academic areas. The understandings they yielded subsequently led to 
the conceptualisation of ‘formal mechanisms’ and ‘informal mechanisms’. Coding categories and 
performance measures defined in the strategic alliancing literature (Gulati and Singh 1998; Ferguson, 
Paulin et al. 2005; Luo 2007; Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009) were used as a benchmark to help define 
the two types of governance arrangements of relevance in the collaborative contracting context.  
The second step of the review focused on construction managment literature, to disaggregate the 
governance arrangements into more specific categories. The review targeted papers published 
between 2000 to 2012 by construction management journals reporting studies related to alliances, 
cooperative procurement, relational contract and partnering. Following the methods used by key 
published conceptual and literature review studies (e.g. Gupta, Smith et al. 2006; Yeung, Chan et al. 
2007) the review canvassed papers published in Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management; Journal of Management in Engineering; Construction Management and Economics; 
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management; International Journal of Project 
Management; and The Engineering Economist. The review especially paid attention to the studies, 
both conceptual (e.g. Eriksson and Westerberg 2011; Lahdenperä 2012) and empirical (e.g. Rahman 
and Kumaraswamy 2008; Love, Mistry et al. 2010), about the essential factors that affect the success 
of collaborative procurement approaches. Some success factors such as trust, attitude, win-win 
philosophy, cooperative culture and open communication are latent cognitive elements which need to 
be activated by governance mechanisms (Lahdenperä 2012).  
The third step of the review is yet to be undertaken. That will involve identifying individual 
mechanisms associated with each governance category that have the potential to influence VfM. In 
addition to the literature reviewed in steps one and two, this step will consider government 
publications (e.g. Department of Treasury and Finance 2006; Department of Treasury and Finance 
2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011) and industry guidelines and reports (e.g. 
Australian Constructors Association 1999; Morwood, Scott et al. 2008) to identify fine-grained 
governance mechanisms that impact VfM in the Australia infrastructure industry.  
The governance categories on which the current paper is based where identified by a coding process 
cross-referenced between three senior researchers, which continued until the number of new catgories 
found, and the new descriptions found, substantially diminished with further reading or cross 
referencing. The content analysis covered assessment of hundreds of relevant journal papers, books, 
government documents, and industry reports.  
3. Analysing Governance Categories 
This  paper describes the operation of each governance category and its potential impact on value-for-
money from constrution projects. 
3.1 Formal Governance Mechanisms of Collaborative Contracts 
The content analysis identified that formal governance mechanisms can be grouped according to the 
following seven categories: negotiated cost, competitive cost, commercial framework, risk and 
reward sharing regime, qualitative performance measurement, collaborative multi-party agreement 
and early contractor involvement (Australian Constructors Association 1999; Morwood, Scott et al. 
2008; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008; Ross 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Lahdenperä 2010; Love, 
Mistry et al. 2010; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Lahdenperä 2012). These 
categories represent depersonalised exchanges, sharing of financial risk and reward, and performance 
measurement, as well as the development and implementation of formal contracts (Ferguson, Paulin 
et al. 2005; Luo 2007; Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). These seven categories are considered to be the 
essential pillars of formal governance that have the most potential to  impact on VfM (Yeung, Chan 
et al. 2007; Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008; Chan, Chan et al. 2010; 
Lahdenperä 2010; Love, Mistry et al. 2010; Lahdenperä 2012). The key characteristics of each 
category are outlined below.  
3.1.1 Negotiated cost 
Negotiated costs are a feature of alliance projects. The contracting parties agree on a cost level prior 
to commencing construction (Lahdenperä 2010; Lahdenperä 2012). The project cost is collectively 
estimated by an integrated team formed by the client, designers, contractors and other service 
providers during the Target Cost Estimate (TCE) phase of an alliance (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 
2011). During the TCE process the parties come together to develop the scope of work, define the 
time schedule, and agree on cost-reimbursable principles, in particular, the project break-even point 
(Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). 
This approach encourages cooperative behaviours and motivates the parties to strive for efficiency 
(Love, Mistry et al. 2010), which in turn helps to achieve a successful alignment of the engineering, 
construction and management solutions to the client’s VfM at a fair price (Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011). As an output of the TCE, the TOC is developed to represent the 
expected cost of the project’s scope at completion, including project specific costs and overheads, as 
well as service providers’ profit margin and non-project related corporate overheads (Morwood, Scott 
et al. 2008; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). The TOC is used as the benchmark to 
assess performance and to determine how risk and rewards are shared by the parties (Morwood, Scott 
et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2010; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). Therefore, TCE’s 
are designed in conjunction with other essential formal mechanisms that aim to increase the certainty 
of successful project delivery and achieving the client’s VfM (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; 
Lahdenperä 2010; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011).  
3.1.2 Competitive cost 
Competitive project costs can be ensured under alliances with either single or multiple TOCs. Single 
and multiple TOC approaches, as well as various hybrids between these two approaches, can be 
employed to ensure competitive costs under collaborative contracts (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2009; Lahdenperä 2010; Love, Mistry et al. 2010). There has 
been an ongoing debate about the advantages and the disadvantages of the alternative approaches 
(Ross 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011).  
In the single TOC approach, the client determines the TOC with only one preferred proponent team, 
which is selected primarily on the basis of experience, capability and attitude (Lahdenperä 2010). 
The primary advantage of this approach lies in its capacity to support the development of a trustful 
and cooperative relationship between the client and the proponent, which has a positive impact on the 
project (Ross 2008). Some argue that this approach lacks sufficient incentive to achieve cost-effective 
pricing that benefits the client (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). This is despite the 
fact that transparent financials are employed to ensure competitive costs. Transparent financials 
enable the  participants in a collaborative contract to understand the nature of fair cost and to reach an 
agreement on a risk and reward formula (Lahdenperä 2012). An open-book accounting approach, 
where the costs of one party are known to all other key parties, is adopted during the TCE, and third 
party financial auditing is involved to ensure the transparency and openness of the commercial 
arrangement (Hauck, Walker et al. 2004; Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2012). This goes 
some way to ensuring competitive costs, while, for alliances, multiple TOC approaches go even 
further. 
Under the governance of the multiple TOC mechanisms, at least two independent proponent teams 
are selected in the first instance based on their experience, capability and attitude, with limited or no 
regard for price (Love, Mistry et al. 2010). The client supports the proponent teams to develop their 
respective designs, execution strategies and associated TOCs, and selects the winning team with an 
emphasis on the price (Lahdenperä 2010; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). It has 
been argued that the multiple/ dual TOC approach builds competitive tension between the proponent 
teams, hence has the advantages of overcoming misalignment during the TCE, enhancing innovation, 
and enabling proponents to differentiate their value proposition (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). This approach also provides flexibility in terms of 
choosing the level of competition between proponents on alliances: both full price competition 
(involving the development of a full TOC) and partial price competition (developing TOC elements) 
are used according to the project nature and circumstances (Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011). In addition, some case study evidence also supports that the total cost to establish a 
TOC using a dual TOC approach was less (of the order of 2% of TOC) than when a single TOC was 
used (Department of Treasury and Finance 2009). However, given the similarities between the dual 
TOC approach and  conventional price-based selection, this approach may compromise the closeness 
and intimacy which assure the development of a collaborative culture at the early stages (Ross 2008).  
Given that between 60% and 70% of the project cost is typically procured in a market tested 
competitive environment, the potential savings by employing the multiple TOC approach can only be 
found in 30% to 40% of the project cost. Hence, these cost savings might not adequately offset the 
cost associated with the multiple TOC development process, if the process is only motivated by cost 
minimisation (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008). The literature confirms that the different  TOC 
approaches are important mechanisms that enable competitive cooperation, whilst acknowledging 
that there is  ambivalence amongst practitioners and theorists with regard to the merit of the different 
levels of price competition that may be employed on alliances (Ross 2008; Lahdenperä 2010; Love, 
Mistry et al. 2010; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011).   
In non-alliancing environments, collaborative contracting in the form of conventional contracts with 
partnership agreements, or early contractor involvement contracts, has a stronger emphasis on cost. 
This may be good for one side of the VfM equation, but the arguments above indicate the potential 
for loss of value stemming from weaker relationships. 
3.1.3 Commercial framework 
The commercial framework of collaborative contracts is typically comprised of three components: 
direct costs and project specific overheads; fee for the service providers, including normal profit and 
non-project specific corporate overheads; and risk and reward amount, as determined by the gain-
share and pain-share mechanisms, which measure the project performance against the TOC and non-
cost related Key Result Areas (KRAs) (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011). The KRAs are measured through Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) (Evans & Peck 2010). Service providers are guaranteed the recovery of project specific costs 
(Lahdenperä 2010), however monies associated with pain share, gain share and risk/ reward are 
recouped through adjustments to the service provider’s fee (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 
2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011).  
Two primary fee payment methods have been used in collaborative contracting, each  encourages 
either cost saving and/ or design innovation (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008). In the fixed payment 
approach, the client fixes the payment as a lump sum based on the TCE, irrespective of the actual 
direct costs for the project, and makes progressive payments on the basis of the pro rata lump sum 
during the project delivery period (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011). This approach offers an incentive for service providers, especially the constructor, 
to minimise construction costs, but may restrict the potential for further design development and 
innovation, which could offset additional design fees the client otherwise needs to pay (Morwood, 
Scott et al. 2008). The variable payment approach, on the other hand, sets the fee payment as a fixed 
percentage of the actual direct cost, irrespective of where the actual cost ends up relative to the TOC. 
This approach supports the integrated design and construction teams to enhance project outcomes 
through innovation, however, may not provide a strong incentive to drive cost reduction (Morwood, 
Scott et al. 2008).  
3.1.4 Risk and reward sharing regimes 
The pain-share and gain-share regime constitutes the foundation of the collaborative contract’s 
commercial framework (Yeung, Chan et al. 2007; Lahdenperä 2010). This regime enables the parties 
(including the client) to share savings and overruns according to the set TOC, i.e., any cost under- or 
over-run against this TOC is split in pre-agreed, specified proportions. The governance mechanisms 
of the regime are designed specifically to spur the parties to invest and cooperate in joint design 
during the development phase, which is critical for innovation and project success (Hauck, Walker et 
al. 2004; Love, Mistry et al. 2010; Lahdenperä 2012). 
The fundamental principle of the collaborative contracting commercial framework is collective risk 
sharing. This principle is supported by gain-share and pain-share mechanisms, whereby a win/win 
and lose/lose rule is applied (Chan, Chan et al. 2010; Lahdenperä 2012). Both cost and non-cost 
performance measures are used to achieve VfM for the client (Yeung, Chan et al. 2007; Morwood, 
Scott et al. 2008). The cost performance measures assess the actual outturn costs (AOC) to deliver the 
work against the agreed TOC. If the project is completed at less than the TOC, the client and service 
providers share additional profits (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Department of 
Infrastructure and Transport 2011). Normally, the client takes 50% of both the gain (profit due to cost 
underruns) and pain (loss due to cost overruns), and the remaining 50% is available to be split 
between the service providers (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011). Some collaborative contracts uncap the cost gain share to give the service provider 
greater incentive to drive cost saving (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008). In recent years, client 
organisations have become increasingly concerned over VfM, and have placed a cap on cost gain 
share to reduce the likelihood of over-pricing during the TCE (i.e., a soft TCE) (Morwood, Scott et 
al. 2008; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011).  
In terms of the pain share, both the client and service providers are liable for the loss if the project 
overruns the TOC (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011). This mechanism puts the fee payment at 100% risk depending on the project 
outcomes. Historically, most collaborative contracts cap the overall risk for each service provider at 
the loss of the service provision fee (Hauck, Walker et al. 2004; Lahdenperä 2010). Hence, even in 
the worst scenario, the service providers will still be reimbursed for the direct costs of the project  
(Morwood, Scott et al. 2008). It has been argued that this mechanism leaves the client to carry the 
entire project overrun if the project becomes distressed, which may undermine the concept of risk and 
opportunity sharing, and ‘best-for-project’ decision making (Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011). 
3.1.5 Qualitative performance measurement 
In addition to the actual target-cost arrangement, collaborative contracts may also include various 
qualitative key performance indicators in the reward system (Lahdenperä 2012). The owner’s non-
price objectives are represented by Key Result Areas (KRAs) such as facility performance, 
disturbance avoidance, good safety, and timely completion. KRA’s are pre-agreed between the client 
and service providers, and are measured through Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) (Morwood, 
Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). The client 
may provide separate funding, that sits outside the agreed TCE, to incentivise the service provider’s 
performance against non-cost KRAs, when exceptional performance exceeding minimum condition 
of satisfaction (MCOS) is required (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011). The service providers may also be liable to pay for  non-cost performance that does 
not meet MCOS (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). 
However, without linking the reward mechanism with the pain share the client may end up funding 
exceptional performance against non-cost KRAs even though the project is over budget (Department 
of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). Conversely, if non-cost positive performance is self-fund, i.e. 
taken from the non-project related component of the TCE (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Department 
of Infrastructure and Transport 2011), and is only rewarded if cost underruns occur, the incentive for 
the service providers to achieve the required performance level for non-cost KRAs may diminish if 
there is a cost overrun (Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011). Therefore, it has been 
suggested that the commercial framework only includes the most important KRAs, where the 
performance measures of other KRAs are not incentivised in a commercial sense (Morwood, Scott et 
al. 2008). In addition, the split between the service providers’ share of gain share/pain share for the 
KRA performance pool depends on the degree to which each participant can influence the outcome 
(Morwood, Scott et al. 2008).  
3.1.6 Collaborative multi-party agreement 
In alliance projects, the collaborative contract is established as a project delivery vehicle. This is a 
multi-party agreement that can be executed by all parties, through which they jointly define their 
respective objectives, establish the commercial arrangement, design the organisational structure and 
decision making processes, and agree on behavioural commitments (Australian Constructors 
Association 1999; Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2009; Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport 2011). Following the principles of relational contracting (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000), 
collaborative contracts focus on the necessity of trust and mutual responsibility and prioritise the 
values  of fairness and cooperation (Chan, Chan et al. 2010; Lahdenperä 2012). Moreover, the 
parties’ collective responsibility for the project is underpinned by mutual liability waivers 
(Lahdenperä 2012) through ‘no dispute’ and ‘no blame’ commitments, which rule out the possibility 
that any participant can be held legally liable for poor performance or negligence (Morwood, Scott et 
al. 2008).  
3.1.7 Early contractor involvement 
Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) is a collaborative project delivery method that brings in 
contractor’s experience and knowledge into the planning and design (Australian Constructors 
Association 1999). In comparison with the traditional contract approach (e.g. design and construct 
contract), the primary advantage of ECI lies in its capacity to enable constructability to be built in 
from the beginning of the project, thereby saving time and cost, and encouraging innovation 
(Edwards 2009). Compared to project alliances, which provide better risk management when a high 
degree of uncertainty is involved in both the development and delivery phases, and therefore requires 
an ongoing collaboration between the owner and service providers, ECI helps to remove initial risk 
uncertainties to a certain degree, and achieves a realistic risk adjusted price (Edwards 2009). Hence 
ECI is more appropriate for managing medium design completion and confidence when less time is 
available (projectmanager.com.au 2011). 
ECI minimises resource requirements during the tendering stage, and uses non-price selection criteria 
and some input cost related criteria at the predetermined stages to select a contractor (Department of 
Main Roads 2009). ECI covers two stages (Department of Main Roads 2009; Edwards 2009). In 
Stage 1 the owner bears most of the project risk and the contractor’s obligations are limited to design 
preparation (Edwards 2009). In the collaborative stage, the contractors, designer and owner work 
together to develop the design, program, budget and risk allocation model. This arrangement not only 
allows the service providers to focus on their skills and experience, but also encourages knowledge 
assimilation and innovation (Edwards 2009). As a result, the owner benefits from a range of design 
scenarios, sensible risk management and appropriate contract development (Department of Main 
Roads 2009). During this stage, transparent cost and documentation enable in-depth discussion and 
understanding of the project requirement (Department of Main Roads 2009). Through risk analysis 
and investigation, the contractor has the opportunity to prepare a price based on reasonable 
understanding of the project, even if certain risks cannot be designed out or otherwise mitigated 
through planning  (Edwards 2009). This approach is essential for VfM, since a secured margin 
increases financial certainty for contractors, thereby reducing the likelihood of margin recovery 
strategies such as claims in Stage 2 (projectmanager.com.au 2011). In addition, price competition 
may be created in Stage 1 to ensure VfM, particularly by public sector clients, through selecting 
multiple bidders (usually up to three) to participate in the scoping and pricing.  On the contrary, 
private sector clients tend to use a sole source or single tenderer to increase collaboration through 
design and construction (projectmanager.com.au 2011). 
In Stage 2, the contractor carries out detailed design and documentation, construction of project 
works, provides materials, labour, plant and equipment, and fulfils other obligations under the 
contract. The method of payment for the contractor can be the agreed Risk Adjusted Price (RAP), in a 
lump sum, a schedule of rates with provisional sums, or a combination of both. The offer can also be 
a Risk Adjusted Maximum Price (RAMP) for the agreed risk allocation and design. Work subject to 
an RAMP is performed as day work and on an open-book basis. The payment to the contractor is 
based on actual cost and at an agreed rate, plus an agreed amount for profit and overheads. The 
opportunity to share in savings and rewards encourages the contractor and the owner to work together 
to reduce project time and cost (projectmanager.com.au 2011). Similarly to project alliances, the 
contractor is financially rewarded for success in some KRAs (e.g. environmental performance and 
early construction completion) from a performance pool (Edwards 2009). Under the circumstance 
that certain risks are out of control of either party, the performance pool is reduced to encourage a 
cooperative approach to deal with the challenges (Edwards 2009). The formal mechanisms adopted 
by the ECI process to increase VfM include: open-book arrangements in Stage 1; selection of 
contractors and designers with a proven track record; an independent estimator to analyse and review 
target costs to validate the Stage 1 output; the rate is decided based on the contractor’s benchmark 
projects; and competitive pricing of supplier and sub-contractor components (Department of Main 
Roads 2009; Edwards 2009).  
3.2 Informal Governance Mechanisms of Collaborative Contracts 
In line with the conceptualisation of informal mechanisms (Gulati and Singh 1998; Luo 2007; 
Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009), the literature review found that informal governance mechanisms can 
be usefully grouped according to four categories: leadership structure, integrated team, team 
workshops and joint management system (Yeung, Chan et al. 2007; Rahman and Kumaraswamy 
2008). These informal governance categories help ensure mutual trust, a win-win philosophy, open 
communication and a collaborative culture (Eriksson and Pesämaa 2007; Yeung, Chan et al. 2007; 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008; Pesämaa, Eriksson et al. 2009; Love, Mistry et al. 2010). Effective 
informal governance creates a social condition conducive to sustaining these latent cognitive factors 
during project delivery (Chan, Chan et al. 2010; Lahdenperä 2012). The four identified categories of 
informal governance are outlined below.  
3.2.1 Leadership structure 
A collaborative contract framework adopts a special leadership structure, where: the project board 
provides vision, governance and leadership; the project management team drives the operational 
project delivery under the leadership of a project manager; and the wider project team implement the 
project  (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Edwards 2009; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 
2011). Unlike a conventional project delivery approach, each level within the leadership structure is 
formed by an integrated team (Chan, Chan et al. 2010). The project board and project management 
team are formed by representatives from both the client organisation and the service providers 
(Hauck, Walker et al. 2004; Edwards 2009). The representatives are selected based on project 
specific experience, leadership and communication capabilities, cultural alignment to the 
collaborative contracting framework, and their capacity to influence resource available to the project 
(Love, Mistry et al. 2010). In order to build mutual understanding and ultimately sustain the client-
service provider relationship, the client’s representatives on the panel for selecting service providers 
are often people who will continue to work within the project (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Edwards 
2009). The project team integrates the resources and capabilities of service providers from wider 
functional areas including design, construction, systems and controls, community and stakeholders, 
environmental, as well as culture and relationships (Chan, Chan et al. 2010). In particular, when 
service providers select partners to form a proponent team, the existing relationship that exists 
between a potential partner and the client, and those among the potential partners themselves, are also 
taken into consideration, along with concerns about complementary resources and capabilities to 
form a project mix (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008).   
3.2.2 Integrated team 
The governance structure of collaborative contracts adopts a wide range of informal mechanisms to 
develop an integrated project team. First of all, culture management is not left to chance (Rahman 
and Kumaraswamy 2004). The management of relationships and culture needs to be included in the 
high performance plan at the beginning of the project (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008). Symbols such as 
team branding, awards, office layout, display of project targets and objectives, and meeting protocols, 
are used to create a culture of cooperation and high performance; the project charter defines the 
requisite  behavioural characteristics for this culture to evolve (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008). 
Newsletters about emerging innovations are distributed to keep people engaged in innovative project 
activities (Love, Mistry et al. 2010). Specific communication tools, such as an expectation matrix, are 
also developed for the team members to align their commitments to each other (Love, Mistry et al. 
2010). It has been suggested that high performance project plans need to be specified with powerful 
meeting architecture (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008). Both focused, integrated workshops and meetings 
are needed to integrate design and construction to ensure that project solutions are cost effective and 
innovative (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008). The client organisations often introduce relationship 
managers to the project team to  align the expectations of and maintain the relationships amongst all 
team members (Rahman and Kumaraswamy 2008). The integrated team formed by staff members of 
all parties is co-located in a common office to facilitate joint problem solving, learning and 
cooperation (Hauck, Walker et al. 2004; Love, Mistry et al. 2010).  
3.2.3 Team workshops 
Relationship workshops are widely used in collaborative projects to facilitate open communication 
and build relationships and mutual understanding (Chan, Chan et al. 2010). Independent facilitators 
are also commonly engaged for team development activities and cultural alignment in workshops 
(Bresnen and Marshall 2000; Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Lahdenperä 2012). Such workshops are 
used intensively in alliance projects and in more conventional projects with arrangements such as 
‘partnering’ or ‘early contractor involvement’ attached. The remainder of the discussion refers mainly 
to an alliance project context.  
During the team formation stage, workshops such as selection workshops and commercial alignment 
workshops are used to tease out technical issues and build relationships between parties (Chan, Chan 
et al. 2010). Through these workshops the client and service providers collectively generate the 
vision for project delivery, develop the principles for the commercial arrangement, and design an 
innovation program (Yeung, Chan et al. 2007; Love, Mistry et al. 2010). The workshops enable the 
parties to discuss and agree on the definition of the elements that make up the direct costs, the 
corporate overheads and normal profit, and to review and agree on the gain share/pain share regime 
including the performance measures for KRAs (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Love, Mistry et al. 
2010). Relationship and team building activities are often intended for key personnel representing the 
contracting parties to strengthen the team spirit (Kumaraswamy, Ling et al. 2005). During project 
operation, workshops are carried out to promote effective coordination of the duties assigned to 
partner members, and to discuss innovations and share knowledge. These workshops can involve 
client and service provider representatives at all levels, including contractors, designers and key sub-
contractors and suppliers (Australian Constructors Association 1999; Bresnen and Marshall 2000; 
Love, Mistry et al. 2010). In the project evaluation phase post-project-delivery, review workshops are 
usually carried out to enable learning, to identify opportunities for improvement of team processes, 
(Love, Mistry et al. 2010) and to reinforce relationships for future projects (Morwood, Scott et al. 
2008).  
3.2.4 Joint management systems 
Collaborative contract governance emphasises the principle of co-operative joint decision making, 
which is realised  through mechanisms that integrate people, systems and processes into a  joint 
management system (Hauck, Walker et al. 2004; Eriksson and Pesämaa 2007; Love, Mistry et al. 
2010). At the early stages of project delivery, the joint decision making system is established through 
integrating the best management systems from each participant organisation, including components 
such as cost control, safety and quality, and information management  (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; 
Love, Mistry et al. 2010). Successful integration enables a mutual understanding of participants’ 
culture and procedures, and ultimately facilitates organisational alignment (Love, Mistry et al. 2010). 
Co-operative joint decision making is required at various levels (Lahdenperä 2012). The project 
board and project management team need to make unanimous decisions on a ‘best for project’ basis 
(Morwood, Scott et al. 2008; Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011; Lahdenperä 2012). 
Complex structural and managerial problems are resolved at the project team level to advance the 
goals of the project ahead of those of individual participant organisations (Hauck, Walker et al. 
2004). For example, on-site construction change orders are managed by the project team at the 
project level (Hauck, Walker et al. 2004).  Project delivery under the governance of collaborative 
contracts especially demands an effective use of shared information technology (IT) systems and 
information processing integration to support open communication and information sharing (Bresnen 
and Marshall 2000; Hauck, Walker et al. 2004; Eriksson and Pesämaa 2007). An integrated web-
based IT system incorporating building information modelling (BIM) is needed to facilitate 
information flow within the joint management system (Lahdenperä 2012). Commission and training 
needs for the IT system need to be addressed at project commencement (Morwood, Scott et al. 2008).  
4. Conclusions 
According to relational contract theory (Macneil 2000), transactions occur only within relations, 
hence the investigation into collaborative contract governance structure needs to engage in combined 
contextual analysis of relations and transactions. The literature review describes a draft framework 
that conceptualises the governance structures of collaborative contracts. The framework asserts that: 
a) the governance structures are supported by seven categories of formal governance mechanisms and 
four categories of informal governance mechanisms; and b) the governance structures have 
significant implications in achieving VfM, which is reflected in project performance. Future more 
refined analysis will enable the construction of measurement scales which will be used by the authors 
in a questionnaire about both types of governance mechanisms in collaborative contracts.  
Future research planned by the authors will test the validity of the proposed measurement scales, at 
the same time providing generalisable statistical evidence concerning the relative value of individual 
governance strategies for VfM in collaborative contracting. There is currently no evidence of this 
type available in academic literature, government reports or industry studies. Such research will 
further extend our conceptual understanding of governance mechanisms in procurement contracts, 
and provide practical outcomes as to the means of maximising value for money on infrastructure 
projects.  
Future research planned by the authors will study the degree to which the implementation of formal 
and informal mechanisms impacts on project performance, guided by the model shown at Figure 1.   
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Figure 1: Conceptual model of governance categories that enhance VfM of collaborative projects 
The current paper has examined the nature of each of the eleven governance categories. The findings 
of the future study will show which specific governance strategies or combinations of strategies 
sitting within each mechanism are most important in providing value for money on collaborative 
contracts in the infrastructure industry.  
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